Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
Introduction
On the evening of 27 September in 1957 Frank Kitson, a British platoon commander stationed in Malaya, stumbled along a dark jungle path and bumped into Tay Boon Hui; a midlevel communist insurgent. The two shook hands. The encounter on the jungle path was not an accident; it had been arranged that day at the request of Tay Boon Hui. Tay Boon Hui served as a loyal and dedicated member of the communist insurgency for nine years, sacrificing everything in his life for the cause. Hui did not have a wife or children; the constantly shifting jungle hideouts of the communists were Hui's home. His dedication and support for the communist cause in Malaya was complete. Despite his commitment, however, within two days of defecting to the British Hui facilitated the surrender of two other terrorists, the ambush and killing of a third terrorist, raids on multiple weapons and supplies caches, the production of psychological propaganda aimed at specific former comrades, and a raid on a communist jungle hideout.
1
Imagine the story of Hui's defection not occurring in a Malayan jungle, but on a mountain path in Afghanistan. That instead of Hui being a committed member of the communist insurgency, the defector in the story is a nine-year veteran of Al Qaeda, and instead of 1957, the story were to occur next month. A mid-level Al Qaeda member energetically working to undermine the enemy would be of significant value to the United States in the War on Terror. The story of Hui's defection was neither a closely held secret nor exceptional during the Malayan conflict; rather, Hui represents one of approximately 2,700 members of the communist insurgency who defected. The Malayan defector program successfully elicited 23% of the 12,000 member insurgent population. 2 The United States would go on to use the defector program from 1 Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber & Faber, 1977) , 135-148. Government between 1963 and 1971. 3 In spite of its demonstrated value defector operations have not been applied to Al Qaeda. 4 The imagined scenario of Al Qaeda members defecting to the United States or to other member states of the coalition could become a reality. Before the United States can establish a defector program against Al Qaeda with an expectation of effectiveness three steps of analysis must be conducted. The first step is to determine the suitability of a defector program as a weapon against Al Qaeda. The primary question to answer is: what can a defector program do for the coalition in its goal of defeating Al Qaeda? To answer this question defector operation's capabilities would be applied against Al Qaeda to determine the program's potential impact. The second step is to establish the feasibility of defector operations as a weapon against Al Qaeda. A defector operation must be able to elicit enemy personnel to abandon their cause and come over to the government's side in the conflict. The critical question to be answered in this step is: can members of Al Qaeda be convinced or enticed to support the government's efforts against Al Qaeda? To answer this question, analysis of Al Qaeda members' psychological motivation as well as the potential effects of various elicitation themes would be conducted. Of particular importance would be the pervasive religious component of Al Qaeda. 5 The final step is to determine whether the cost of establishing a defector program is acceptable. The last question to be answered is: what would the required organizational and operational structure to conduct a defector program against Al Qaeda cost? To answer this question the requirements for running a defector operation tailored for Al Qaeda would have to be determined. 6 A key aspect would be determining the expenditure in effort and money required from U.S. agencies and participating coalition partners as well as potentially non-partner nations. Once the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the United States establishing an effective defector program is determined then the imagined scenario of former Al Qaeda members reaching out to join hands with U.S. soldiers could become a reality.
The focus of this paper is the first step: determining the suitability of defector operations as a weapon against Al Qaeda. To determine suitability capability must be contrasted with structure.
The methodology for conducting this contrast is to overlay defector operation's Lines of
Capability (LOC's) onto Al Qaeda's Lines of Operations (LOO's). This overlay will identify
where and how a defector program would impact Al Qaeda and the subsequent benefits for the United States. However before the contrasting can be accomplished the specific LOC's of defector operations must be presented. These capabilities will be taken from historical case studies as well as academic research. Al Qaeda's LOO's will then be presented. The model used to present Al Qaeda's structure is that of an insurgency. This model was chosen because Al
Qaeda is an insurgency. Also, the majority of instances where defector operations were employed has been against insurgencies. Subsequently the majority of the data about defector operations comes from their use against insurgencies. Once the overlay is completed and the potential impact of a United States operated defector program against Al Qaeda extrapolated, the thesis of this paper will be validated: that defector operations are a suitable weapon for use against Al The first LOO of the insurgency model comes from the cause. An insurgency uses a cause to gain support from the masses and possibly outside sources. 12 The cause can contain both calls for change, such as land reform, along with grievances that stir anti-government emotion. The insurgency's LOO for its cause is the requirement for the insurgency to both disseminate and popularize the cause. This LOO takes the form of Information Operations, to include propaganda, to target the masses and attack the government. 13 The second LOO in the model stems from the insurgency's inherent vulnerability. An insurgency is militarily weaker than the government, and though this relationship will change as an insurgency approaches success, an insurgency cannot allow the government to set the conditions for engagements. An insurgency must be able to 10 Ibid., 13.
11 Kilcullen, 6. The only thorough critical analysis of defector operations as an independent subject, rather than an historical analysis of specific programs, is that done by 30 FM 3-24, 3-27 and 1-19. 31 The FM 3-24 custodian stated that attempts were made to incorporate defector operations into the current version of FM 3-24. Why these attempts failed is not specifically clear. However there are tentative plans to incorporate defector operations into future versions of the manual. Long does not use the term defector nor does he explain why he chooses to use the term amnesty instead of defector. Neither the JP 1-02 nor FM 1-02 define amnesty nor use that word in other definitions. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines amnesty as "the act of authority (as a government) that a pardon is granted to a large group of individuals." 37 The term amnesty does not capture the idea that something of value is being obtained by the government for granting a pardon to the group. Amnesty also specifically references a group instead of an individual, and does not indicate that the group being pardoned had previously opposed the government. For these reasons, and in spite of Long's use of the term, amnesty is an inappropriate term to be used in association with defector operations.
Defector Operations Lines of Capability
With defector and defector operation defined the benefits a government would expect from establishing a defector program, or the expected LOC's of a defector operation, will be the only institution that has sought to persuade enemy soldiers and civilians to rally to the GVN [Government of Vietnam] side and has established instrumentalities for neutralizing such defectors, obtaining intelligence through them, indoctrinating them with a view to winning and retaining their loyalty, and even, to some extent, training them for economic survival in a slowly urbanized society.
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The most detailed consolidated description of a defector program, Koch's description includes all three elements of a defector program: capabilities, elicitation, and structure. Gaining intelligence from defectors is a capability (an LOC). Persuading enemy fighters to defect is the elicitation component and the instrumentalities for indoctrination and vocational training are part of the structure. This paper deals strictly with capabilities; therefore, the LOC's for defector operations will have to be created. 37 Merriam-Webster, s.v. "Amnesty." http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amnesty (accessed November 25, 2007) . 38 Koch, iii. Gaining intelligence is the most obvious and documented capability gained from a defector and likely the most vital. According to the FM 3-24 the success of a COIN effort depends on intelligence. 39 The defector has potentially lived among the insurgency for years, knows the identity, personal history, and position of multiple members of the insurgency as well as the support network. In his 1969 article "Defector Operations" Lieutenant Colonel John Ozaki writes that one of the key types of intelligence that can be gained from a defector is the identity of the insurgents. Besides the identity of the insurgents themselves, Ozaki adds, a defector can provide insight into insurgent tactics, the areas that the insurgents operate and the current status of the insurgent force. These insights are "invaluable". act. An officially enforced internal spying ring would have negative effects on morale. The possibly most destabilizing impact of a defector program is that whenever an insurgent went missing his full knowledge of the internal workings of the insurgency were assumed to be compromised to government forces. The VC dictated that in the case of a suspected defection higher headquarters had to be immediately notified. Protective measures had to be taken for agents and operators working in government controlled areas, combat plans modified, and the scheduled movement of equipment changed.
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A graphical depiction of defector operations LOC's appears in Figure 1 . With the LOC's established, the next step in the methodology will be to determine Al Qaeda's Lines of Operations.
60 Thompson, 90. 61 O'Brien, 22-23. 62 Koch, 130. Gunaratna, 85. 84 U.S. Department of Defense, "JTF-GTMO Information on Detainees," (March 4, 2005) , http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050304info.pdf (accessed December 6, 2007) 85 Gunaratna, 87. 86 Ibid., 87.
cause. 87 The vast oil wealth that flows within these same cultures ensures a significant economic resource from which to provide support.
In distributing capital Al Qaeda employs the same charities, relationships, and supporters as it does to raise finances. In addition, Al Qaeda employs the powerful hawala banking system. 88 In spite of U.S. sanctions and regulations designed to establish accountability for this informal money transferring system, the global network is still a robust and effective means of moving money undetected. In Pakistan alone there were an estimated 1100 hawala institutes that In his book "Understanding Terror Networks" Marc Sageman conducts a critical analysis of Al Qaeda's ability to gain new members. Sageman analyzes the individuals involved in both the U.S.
87 Kilcullen, [9] [10] Hawala is an ancient money transferring system. The system does not move the actual funds between provider and recipient. Rather a hawala agent receives the funds from the provider then directs a partner agent, using the entire spectrum of communication means, to provide the amount of funds received, minus a transfer fee, to the recipient. 100 Al Qaeda. 101 Gunaratna, 77. 102 Thompson, 30. into the global network of Islamic Jihadists is more difficult to define. Some descriptions of this other network categorize it as a "franchise" or "venture capital" system between Al Qaeda's leadership and dispersed like-minded individuals or organizations. 103 Kilcullen argues that Al Qaeda's networked structure is more a system of patronage built upon familial relationships, financial exchanges, personal relationships, and support links. Al Qaeda lends support to these disparate elements in the form of financing, operational guidance, intelligence, and specialized skill sets via its affiliates. With the exception of 9/11, each of Al Qaeda's attacks has occurred in theatres where there was a pre-existing Islamic insurgency. It is obvious that Al Qaeda has done an excellent job of executing the insurgency LOO's.
Although it is debatable whether Al Qaeda is making any significant progress towards its objectives, there is no doubt that Al Qaeda has continued to operate in spite of a world wide effort to destroy it. The issue of Al Qaeda's effectiveness at achieving its objective is irrelevant here. As long as Al Qaeda is capable of conducting attacks against the United States and its allies Al Qaeda's existence will be unacceptable. In the execution of its LOO's Al Qaeda has taken full Information Operations (deed & word) Establishing Safe Base of Operations (consolidated & dispersed) Secrecy (members identity & communication) Establishing Support (generating & moving) Creating and Maintaining Internal Structure (headquarters & global) Gaining New Members (individuals & groups) With Al Qaeda's LOO's presented, the suitability of using a defector operation to attack these LOO's will be determined. This determination will be made by contrasting capabilities with structure. 
Defector Operations vs. Al Qaeda

Intelligence
Defector-generated intelligence was deemed the greatest derivative advantage of defector programs in the last century and it would be the same with Al Qaeda. Secrecy is Al Qaeda's most critical LOO. Al Qaeda must be free to operate in the countries upon which it has declared war.
Al Qaeda is not capable, without long-range weapons, to project its power from its isolated safe haven in Pakistan. In order to conduct propaganda of the deed and generate the needed publicity and support Al Qaeda's operatives have to physically penetrate these nations. Al Qaeda also relies on the vast financial wealth from charities that operate within these nations. Its front companies also rely on the stability of governed nations to generate funds. Any intelligence a defector provided whether regarding an operations cell, network, or financial system would be subject to immediate action by local and international law enforcement entities. Al Qaeda's ability to generate new members in these target countries would also be jeopardized. Defectors would know the identity of the link that enabled their joining the organization. The critical link between Al Qaeda and other insurgent organization would also be compromised for if it became unsafe to associate with Al Qaeda then it would become unpopular as well.
There are elements of Al Qaeda that would appear less susceptible or negligibly affected by defector-generated intelligence. PSYOPS, regardless of its quality, would have minimal to no impact on preventing Al Qaeda's propaganda of the deed attacks, nor would it affect the hawala money transfer networks.
There are certain individuals in Al Qaeda who will never be dissuaded from the validity of their cause; these people will continue to fight until they are captured or killed. This committed population includes the majority of the headquarters element. There are also those people who support or facilitate the organization for other-than-religiously reasons, such as financial gains.
The act of invalidating Al Qaeda's religious credibility is a significantly daunting one, but a mandatory process in defeating Al Qaeda and the similar organizations that will follow behind it.
110 Defector assisted PSYOPS can play a major role in the effort.
Government Legitimacy
By individual, irrelevant of position, must possess a significant level of cultural awareness. The challenge of providing this culturally aware force, which Kilcullen states a professional army will never be able to do in significant numbers, is compounded by Al Qaeda's global nature. Because Al Qaeda is engaged in an overlapping manner upon other regional issues, some dating back centuries, there will be multiple levels of culture effecting the environment wherever Al Qaeda operates. 111 The task of preparing a force capable of operating at these multiple levels simultaneously is daunting, but can be made significantly less so with the aid of individuals who have already operated or even grown up at those levels: defectors.
COIN Force Enhancement
Insurgent Instability
In an insurgency, the struggle is for the popular support. As the government's efforts in PSYOPS and government legitimacy are increased through the use of a defector program, the insurgent's success at gaining popular support will naturally decrease. With a decrease in popular support, Al Qaeda will loose valuable support in financing, facilitating expansion through new members, and mission support. In attempting to limit the damage from defectors and to prevent further defections Al Qaeda would have to take countermeasures. The most obvious of countermeasures would be a clamp down on security. With each attempt to tighten security, however, Al Qaeda's ability to conduct operations and maintain its disbursed network would be made more difficult. Sageman credits the failure of eight Al Qaeda plots to poor communication within the organization. 112 As security is tightened, the ability of members to react to unanticipated complications during the planning and execution of attacks would only decrease.
The tighter its security, the less agile a network becomes. Al Qaeda would also have to become more cautious with new members in order to prevent further compromise through more defections. The pool of potential new members would summarily decrease.
Conclusion
By understanding defector operation's capabilities as well as Al Qaeda's LOO's it is clear that defector operations would be a suitable weapon against Al Qaeda. Defector operation's capabilities provide impact across the spectrum of Al Qaeda operations without negative repercussions to the government. Although Al Qaeda is a powerful and intelligent adversary it must expose its weaknesses in order to achieve its objectives. Defector operations target those exposed weaknesses with efficient lethality. Countermeasures taken to prevent attack only serve 111 Ibid., 22 and 31.
112 Sageman, 167. to degrade the organization more. Defector operations also serve to tighten alliances, bringing together partner nations in a positive endeavor that kinetic operations do not offer. 
